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173 46-18-201 77 46-18-202 154 46-18-203 10 46-18-204 4 46-18-205 3 46-18-206 11 46-18-207 10 46-18-208 1 46-18-211 46-18-212 1 46-18-213 3 46-18-219 1 46-18-220 21 46-18-221 32 46-18-222 5 46-18-223 46-18-224 16 46-18-225 46-18-226 46-18-230 33 46-18-231 42 46-18-232 1 46-18-233 5 46-18-234 2 46-18-235 24 46-18-236 3 46-18-237 51 46-18-241 30 46-18-242 59 46-18-243 27 46-18-244 2 46-18-245 21 46-18-246 5 46-18-247 1 46-18-248 8 46-18-249 2 46-18-250 3 46-18-251 7 46-18-255 1 46-18-256 46-18-261

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-225

(2021)

Sentencing of nonviolent felony offenders – criteria – alternatives to be considered – court to state reasons for imprisonment

(1) In sentencing a nonviolent felony offender, the sentencing judge shall first consider alternatives to imprisonment of the offender in a state prison, including placement of the offender in a community corrections facility or program, a prerelease center, a prerelease program, or a day reporting program provided for in 53-1-203. In considering alternatives to imprisonment, the sentencing judge shall examine the sentencing criteria contained in subsection (2).

(2) Prior to sentencing a nonviolent felony offender to whom 46-18-219 does not apply to a term of imprisonment in a state prison, the sentencing judge shall take into account whether:

(a) the interests of justice and the needs of public safety truly require the level of security provided by imprisonment of the offender in a state prison;

(b) the needs of the offender can be better served in the community or in a facility or program other than a state prison;

(c) there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the offense, though failing to establish a defense;

(d) the offender acted under strong provocation;

(e) the offender has made restitution or will make restitution to the victim of the offender's criminal conduct;

(f) the offender has no prior history of conviction for a criminal act or, if the offender has a prior history of conviction for a criminal act, the offender has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime;

(g) the offender's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances that are unlikely to recur;

(h) the character and attitude of the offender indicate that the offender is likely to commit another crime;

(i) the offender is likely to respond quickly to correctional or rehabilitative treatment; and

(j) imprisonment of the offender would create an excessive hardship on the offender or the offender's family.

(3) If the judge sentences the offender to a state prison, the judge shall state the reasons why the judge did not select an alternative to imprisonment, based on the criteria contained in subsection (2).

Opinions construing this section

16 opinions
2026 MT 202 Aug 25, 2026 Reversed
State v. T.W. Hatfield
Majority by Ingrid Gustafson · 5 to 0
nder is relevant in sentencing because a sentencing court must consider alternatives to imprisonment for nonviolent offenders—but not for violent offenders. Section 46-18-225, MCA. What constitutes a “crime of violence” is defined by § 46-18-104(2), MCA, which specifically provides: (2)(a) “Crime of violence” means: (i) a crime
2024 MT 62N Mar 19, 2024 Affirmed
State v. M. Severson
Majority by Mike McGrath · 4 to 0
7. In Montana, exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences—much like sentencing alternatives—are strictly a matter of statute. Compare § 46-18222, MCA, with § 46-18-225, MCA, see Shults, ¶ 34. Our review of 5 Effective in 2019, the Legislature increased the mandatory parole ineligibility period set forth in § 45-5-503(4)(a)(i),
2023 MT 206N Oct 31, 2023 Affirmed
State v. S. Clifton
Majority by Mike McGrath · 5 to 0
. ¶6 As an initial matter, the District Court could have legally imposed a sentence of up to 20 years under § 45-9-103, MCA. Additionally, §§ 45-9-202 and 46-18-225, MCA, do not preclude a court from sentencing a nonviolent felony offender to prison. See State v. Swoboda, 276 Mont. 479, 482, 918 P.2d 296, 298 (1996). Finally, o
2021 MT 23N Feb 2, 2021 Affirmed
State v. J. Marsh
Majority by Mike McGrath · 5 to 0
d ineffective assistance of counsel as his attorney did not request that the sentencing court explicitly consider the nonviolent offender criteria described in § 46-18-225, MCA. ¶11 We generally do not address issues not raised below. State v. George, 2020 MT 56, ¶ 4, 399 Mont. 173, 459 P.3d 854 (citation omitted). However, we wil
2018 MT 253 Oct 16, 2018 Affirmed in part, reversed in part
State v. J. Hamilton
Majority by Laurie McKinnon · 5 to 0
In Montana, exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences—much like sentencing alternatives—are strictly a matter of statute. Compare § 46-18-222, MCA with § 46-18-225, MCA; see Shults, ¶ 34. Our review of mandatory minimum sentence exceptions requires us to analyze whether the district court correctly applied the statute. See Sh
Official Annotations archive.org, 2021 edition
History:
En. Sec. 4, Ch. 794, L. 1991
Amd. Sec. 66, Ch. 10, L. 1993
Amd. Sec. 15, Ch. 482, L. 1995
Amd. Sec. 215, Ch. 546, L. 1995
Amd. Sec. 7, Ch. 189, L. 1997
Amd. Sec. 9, Ch. 52, L. 1999 (HB 48 - McGee, Dan (R) HD 21)
Amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 517, L. 2005 (HB 726 - Gutsche, Gail (D) HD 99)