Consent as defense

(1) The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense.

(2) Consent is ineffective if:

(a) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense;

(b) it is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or disorder, or intoxication is unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense;

(c) it is induced by force, duress, or deception;

(d) it is against public policy to permit the conduct or the resulting harm, even though consented to; or

(e) for offenses under 45-5-502, 45-5-503, 45-5-508, 45-5-601, or Title 45, chapter 5, part 7, it is given by a person who the offender knew or reasonably should have known was a victim of human trafficking, as defined in 45-5-701, or was subjected to force, fraud, or coercion, either of which caused the person to be in the situation where the offense occurred.