Table of Contents TITLE 46. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CHAPTER 18. SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT Part 2. Form of Sentence
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173 46-18-201 77 46-18-202 154 46-18-203 10 46-18-204 4 46-18-205 3 46-18-206 11 46-18-207 10 46-18-208 1 46-18-211 46-18-212 1 46-18-213 3 46-18-219 1 46-18-220 21 46-18-221 32 46-18-222 5 46-18-223 46-18-224 16 46-18-225 46-18-226 46-18-230 33 46-18-231 42 46-18-232 1 46-18-233 5 46-18-234 2 46-18-235 24 46-18-236 3 46-18-237 51 46-18-241 30 46-18-242 59 46-18-243 27 46-18-244 2 46-18-245 21 46-18-246 5 46-18-247 1 46-18-248 8 46-18-249 2 46-18-250 3 46-18-251 7 46-18-255 1 46-18-256 46-18-261

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-222

(2023)

Exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences, restrictions on deferred imposition and suspended execution of sentence, and restrictions on parole eligibility

Mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the laws of this state, mandatory life sentences prescribed by 46-18-219, the restrictions on deferred imposition and suspended execution of sentence prescribed by 45-9-101(6), 45-9-103(3), 46-18-201(1)(b), 46-18-205, 46-18-221(3), 46-18-224, and 46-18-502(3), and restrictions on parole eligibility prescribed by 45-5-503(4), 45-5-507(5), 45-5-601(3), 45-5-625(4), 45-5-711, 45-9-101(6), and 45-9-103(3) do not apply if:

(1) the offender was less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced;

(2) the offender's mental capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced, was significantly impaired, although not so impaired as to constitute a defense to the prosecution. However, a voluntarily induced intoxicated or drugged condition may not be considered an impairment for the purposes of this subsection.

(3) the offender, at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced, was acting under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as would constitute a defense to the prosecution;

(4) the offender was an accomplice, the conduct constituting the offense was principally the conduct of another, and the offender's participation was relatively minor;

(5) except for offenses committed under 45-5-706 and 45-5-711, in a case in which the threat of bodily injury or actual infliction of bodily injury is an actual element of the crime, no serious bodily injury was inflicted on the victim unless a weapon was used in the commission of the offense; or

(6) the offense was committed under 45-5-502(3), 45-5-508, or 45-5-601(3) and the judge determines, based on the findings contained in a psychosexual evaluation report prepared by a qualified sexual offender evaluator pursuant to the provisions of 46-23-509, that treatment of the offender while incarcerated, while in a residential treatment facility, or while in a local community affords a better opportunity for rehabilitation of the offender and for the ultimate protection of the victim and society, in which case the judge shall include in its judgment a statement of the reasons for its determination.

Opinions construing this section

32 opinions
2018 MT 253 Oct 16, 2018 Affirmed in part, reversed in part
State v. J. Hamilton
Majority by Laurie McKinnon · 5 to 0
30, 136 P.3d 507. ¶15 In Montana, exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences—much like sentencing alternatives—are strictly a matter of statute. Compare § 46-18-222, MCA with § 46-18-225, MCA; see Shults, ¶ 34. Our review of mandatory minimum sentence exceptions requires us to analyze whether the district court correctly app
2018 MT 49 Mar 20, 2018 Affirmed
State v. M. Hinshaw
Majority by Ingrid Gustafson · 5 to 0
entence, Motion to Challenge Imposition of PFO and Brief in Support. Therein, Hinshaw argued the PFO statute was unconstitutional and requested the court apply § 46-18-222(2), MCA, to find an exception to the mandatory minimum sentence. ¶5 At sentencing, the District Court indicated it was unwilling to find the PFO statute unconstitut
2016 MT 82N Apr 5, 2016 Affirmed
State v. Moog
Majority by Mike McGrath · 5 to 0
al duress Moog was under, she contends that she lost the opportunity to receive a more lenient sentence because her counsel did not argue the applicability of § 46-18-222, MCA, at sentencing. Section 46-18-222, MCA, states in relevant part that mandatory minimums otherwise prescribed in statutes do not apply in cases in which, at the
2015 MT 118 May 5, 2015 Unknown opinion
Beach v. State
Concurring by Laurie McKinnon · 3 to 3 with 1 concurring
. Judge Sorte had full discretion in sentencing Beach, including the ability to find a statutory exception to the mandatory minimum based on Beach’s age. See § 46-18-222(1), MCA (1978). Unlike the fourteenyear-old defendants in Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, Beach was a few months shy of eighteen when he committed this of
2014 MT 312 Nov 25, 2014 Affirmed
State v. Daniel Garner
Majority by Laurie McKinnon · 5 to 0
arner’s sentence could not ordinarily be suspended under § 46-18-205(2), MCA, the requirements of that section are subject to statutory exceptions listed at § 46-18-222, MCA. Thus, Garner could have received a fully suspended sentence based on his mental capacity at the time of the offense. Section 46-18-222(2), MCA. This argument
Official Annotations archive.org, 2023 edition
History:
En. 95-2206.18 by Sec. 14, Ch. 584, L. 1977
R.C.M. 1947, 95-2206.18
Amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 322, L. 1979
Amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 396, L. 1979
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 207, L. 1981
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 327, L. 1981
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 392, L. 1983
Amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 532, L. 1983
Amd. Sec. 105, Ch. 370, L. 1987
Amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 564, L. 1991
Amd. Sec. 46, Ch. 262, L. 1993
Amd. Sec. 12, Ch. 125, L. 1995
Amd. Sec. 14, Ch. 482, L. 1995
Amd. Sec. 8, Ch. 52, L. 1999 (HB 48 - McGee, Dan (R) HD 21)
Amd. Sec. 17, Ch. 483, L. 2007 (SB 547 - Perry, Gary (R) SD 35)
Amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 30, L. 2013 (HB 137 - Dudik, Kimberly (D) HD 99)
Amd. Sec. 13, Ch. 374, L. 2013 (HB 478 - Laszloffy, Sarah (R) HD 57)
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 110, L. 2015 (HB 88 - Laszloffy, Sarah (R) HD 53)
Amd. Sec. 22, Ch. 285, L. 2015 (HB 89 - Dudik, Kimberly (D) HD 94)
Amd. Sec. 5, Ch. 279, L. 2017 (SB 29 - Sands, Diane (D) SD 49)
Amd. Sec. 27, Ch. 321, L. 2017 (HB 133 - McConnell, Nate (D) HD 89)
Amd. Sec. 30, Ch. 167, L. 2023 (HB 112 - Etchart, Jodee (R) HD 48)
Amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 543, L. 2023 (HB 791 - Sprunger, Courtenay (R) HD 7)
Source text on leg.mt.gov