Edition 2001 Other editions
Current Version 2025 2023 2021 2019 2015 2013 2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 1978 Scanned 1979 Scanned 1981 Scanned 1983 Scanned 1985 Scanned 1986 Scanned 1987 Scanned 1989 Scanned
1995 forward is searchable text. Earlier volumes are page scans.
173 46-18-201 77 46-18-202 154 46-18-203 10 46-18-204 4 46-18-205 1 46-18-211 46-18-212 1 46-18-213 3 46-18-219 1 46-18-220 21 46-18-221 32 46-18-222 5 46-18-223 46-18-224 16 46-18-225 33 46-18-231 42 46-18-232 1 46-18-233 5 46-18-234 2 46-18-235 24 46-18-236 3 46-18-237 51 46-18-241 30 46-18-242 59 46-18-243 27 46-18-244 2 46-18-245 21 46-18-246 5 46-18-247 1 46-18-248 8 46-18-249 2 46-18-250 3 46-18-251 7 46-18-255 1 46-18-256 46-18-261

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-222

(2001)

Exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences and restrictions on deferred imposition and suspended execution of sentence

Mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the laws of this state, mandatory life sentences prescribed by 46-18-219, and the restrictions on deferred imposition and suspended execution of sentence prescribed by 46-18-201(1)(b), 46-18-205, 46-18-221(3), 46-18-224, and 46-18-502(3) do not apply if:

(1) the offender was less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced;

(2) the offender's mental capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced, was significantly impaired, although not so impaired as to constitute a defense to the prosecution. However, a voluntarily induced intoxicated or drugged condition may not be considered an impairment for the purposes of this subsection.

(3) the offender, at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced, was acting under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as would constitute a defense to the prosecution;

(4) the offender was an accomplice, the conduct constituting the offense was principally the conduct of another, and the offender's participation was relatively minor;

(5) in a case in which the threat of bodily injury or actual infliction of bodily injury is an actual element of the crime, no serious bodily injury was inflicted on the victim unless a weapon was used in the commission of the offense; or

(6) the offense was committed under 45-5-502(3) and the judge determines that treatment of the offender in a local community affords a better opportunity for rehabilitation of the offender and for the ultimate protection of the victim and society, in which case the judge shall include in its judgment a statement of the reasons for its determination.

Opinions construing this section

32 opinions
2026 MT 202 Aug 25, 2026 Reversed
State v. T.W. Hatfield
Majority by Ingrid Gustafson · 5 to 0
cifically referencing the sentencing policy outlined by § 46-18-101(2), (3), MCA, and noting that its exceptions to any mandatory minimums were analyzed under § 46-18-222, MCA. In paragraph 4, the judgment states, “The nature of the crimes pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-104 are crimes of violence and incarceration is warrante
2025 MT 138 Jul 1, 2025 Affirmed in part, reversed in part
State v. J. Warr
Majority by Katherine M Bidegaray · 5 to 0
ment. We address the following issues: 1. Did the District Court erroneously conclude that the mandatory minimum sentence exception for mental impairment under § 46-18-222(2), MCA, did not apply? 2. Did the District Court violate § 46-12-211(4), MCA, when it denied Warr an opportunity to withdraw his plea after rejecting the plea agreem
2025 MT 30 Feb 11, 2025 Affirmed
State v. G. Lee
Majority by Cory J. Swanson · 7 to 0
ty, at the time of the commission of the offense . . . , was significantly impaired, although not so impaired as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.” Section 46-18-222(2), MCA. ¶5 On July 27, 2022, Lee and the State entered into an open plea agreement in which he acknowledged that “[b]y pleading Guilty I waive my right to appeal
2024 MT 62N Mar 19, 2024 Affirmed
State v. M. Severson
Majority by Mike McGrath · 4 to 0
sentencing recommendation. ¶4 Prior to sentencing, Severson filed a sentencing memorandum in which he advised the District Court he was seeking, pursuant to § 46-18-222(2), MCA,3 an exception to the mandatory minimum sentence provided in § 45-5-503(4)(a)(i), MCA, based on significant impairment of his mental capacity. In that memoran
2022 MT 176 Sep 13, 2022 Affirmed
State v. J. Brown
Majority by Beth Baker · 5 to 0
the offender is to be sentenced, was acting under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as would constitute a defense to the prosecution.” Section 46-18-222(3), MCA. “When the application of an exception . . . is an issue, the court shall grant the defendant a hearing prior to the imposition of sentence to determine the
Official Annotations archive.org, 2001 edition
History:
En. 95-2206.18 by Sec. 14, Ch. 584, L. 1977
R.C.M. 1947, 95-2206.18
Amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 322, L. 1979
Amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 396, L. 1979
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 207, L. 1981
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 327, L. 1981
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 392, L. 1983
Amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 532, L. 1983
Amd. Sec. 105, Ch. 370, L. 1987
Amd. Sec. 3, Ch. 564, L. 1991
Amd. Sec. 46, Ch. 262, L. 1993
Amd. Sec. 12, Ch. 125, L. 1995
Amd. Sec. 14, Ch. 482, L. 1995
Amd. Sec. 8, Ch. 52, L. 1999 (HB 48 - McGee, Dan (R) HD 21)