Matter of C.R., N.R., E.R. & J.R

Majority W. William Leaphart

November 6 2007 DA 07-0278 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2007 MT 284N IN THE MATTER OF C.R., N.R., E.R., & J.R., Youths In Need Of Care. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District, In and For the County of Deer Lodge, Cause No. DN 05-13, Honorable Ray Dayton, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Francis P. McGee, Attorney at Law, Butte, Montana David L. Vicevich, Attorney at Law, Butte, Montana For Appellee: Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General, Jennifer M. Anders, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 26, 2007 Decided: November 6, 2007 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk  Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 R.R. and K.R., parents of C.R., N.R., E.R., and J.R., appeal the District Court’s order terminating their parental rights. We affirm. ¶3 The Department of Public Health and Human Services (hereinafter “DPHHS”) removed C.R., N.R., E.R., and J.R. from their parents’ home in September 2005. Among other concerns, the DPHHS social worker observed physical signs of abuse and neglect, including bruises, open sores, and lice, and had received a report that the family resided in a house with a known sex offender. The parents stipulated to a petition declaring the children youths in need of care, and the children were placed in foster care. More than fifteen months later, DPHHS filed for termination of K.R.’s and R.R.’s parental rights. ¶4 We review a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. In re K.J.B., 2007 MT 216, ¶ 22, 339 Mont. 28, ¶ 22, 168 P.3d 629, ¶ 22. In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we consider “whether the trial court acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.” In re K.J.B., ¶ 22 (citation omitted). 2  ¶5 In order to satisfy the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights, the district court must make specific factual findings. In re K.J.B., ¶ 23. We review these findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. In re K.J.B., ¶ 23. We review the district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. In re K.J.B., ¶ 23. ¶6 If a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, § 41-3- 604, MCA, requires the State to file a petition for termination of parental rights. Pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, a court may order the termination of parental rights for a youth who has been adjudicated in need of care where, by a showing of clear and convincing evidence, the party seeking termination demonstrates that: (i) an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court has not been complied with by the parents or has not been successful; and (ii) the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Alternatively, parental rights may be terminated simply by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that “parental rights to the child’s sibling . . . [were] involuntarily terminated and the circumstances related to the termination of parental rights are relevant to the parent’s ability to adequately care for the child at issue.” Sections 41-3-609(1)(d), 41-3-423(2)(e), MCA. Under these sections, the court is not required to find that the parent failed to comply with an appropriate treatment plan or that the parent’s conduct is unlikely to change. ¶7 Here, the children were in foster care for more than fifteen of the last twenty-two months at the time DPHHS filed its petition to terminate R.R.’s and K.R.’s rights. 3  Because R.R. and K.R. had their rights to a fifth child involuntarily terminated on February 8, 2007, technically, the District Court did not even need to consider whether the parents complied with an appropriate treatment plan before terminating custody in this case. Nonetheless, the District Court found that an appropriate treatment plan was in place, and that neither K.R. nor R.R. “actively participated in, complied with, or completed their treatment plan.” The District Court also found that the conditions rendering K.R. and R.R. unfit to parent were not likely to change within a reasonable time. There is an abundance of evidence in the record to support both these findings. ¶8 In sum, the statutory criteria for termination were met by clear and convincing evidence in the instant case. K.R. and R.R. have failed to demonstrate that the District Court abused its discretion in terminating their parental rights. ¶9 It is appropriate to decide this case pursuant to our Order of February 11, 2003, amending Section 1.3 of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules and providing for memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us that the appeal is without merit because the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, the legal issues are clearly controlled by settled Montana law which the District Court correctly interpreted, and there was clearly no abuse of discretion by the District Court. ¶10 We affirm. /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 4  We concur: /S/ KARLA M. GRAY /S/ JAMES C. NELSON /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ BRIAN MORRIS 5