Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-220

(2023)

Stalking – exemption – penalty

(1) A person commits the offense of stalking if the person purposely or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to:

(a) fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or

(b) suffer other substantial emotional distress.

(2) For the purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

(a) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which the offender directly or indirectly, by any action, method, communication, or physical or electronic devices or means, follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, or intimidates a person or interferes with a person's property.

(b) "Monitors" includes the use of any electronic, digital, or global positioning device or similar technological means.

(c) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person under similar circumstances as the victim. This is an objective standard.

(d) "Substantial emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress that may but does not necessarily require medical or other professional treatment or counseling.

(3) This section does not apply to a constitutionally protected activity.

(4) (a) Except as provided in subsection (4)(b), for the first offense, a person convicted of stalking shall be imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed 1 year or fined an amount not to exceed $1,000, or both.

(b) For a second or subsequent offense within 20 years or for a first offense when the offender violated any order of protection, when the offender used force or a weapon or threatened to use force or a weapon, or when the victim is a minor and the offender is at least 5 years older than the victim, the offender shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 5 years or fined an amount not to exceed $10,000, or both.

(c) A person convicted of stalking may be sentenced to pay all medical, counseling, and other costs incurred by or on behalf of the victim as a result of the offense.

(5) Upon presentation of credible evidence of violation of this section, an order may be granted, as set forth in Title 40, chapter 15, restraining a person from engaging in the activity described in subsection (1).

(6) For the purpose of determining the number of convictions under this section, "conviction" means:

(a) a conviction, as defined in 45-2-101, in this state;

(b) a conviction for a violation of a statute similar to this section in another state; or

(c) a forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the defendant's appearance in court in this state or another state for a violation of a statute similar to this section, which forfeiture has not been vacated.

(7) Attempts by the accused person to contact or follow the stalked person after the accused person has been given actual notice that the stalked person does not want to be contacted or followed constitutes prima facie evidence that the accused person purposely or knowingly followed, harassed, threatened, or intimidated the stalked person.

Opinions construing this section

38 opinions
2015 MT 251 Aug 25, 2015 Affirmed
State v. Strong
Majority by Beth Baker · 5 to 2
ggests that § 45-5-626(1), MCA, is ambiguous “as to what exactly constitutes a complete offense,” and analogizes to the offense of stalking, set forth in § 45-5-220, MCA. He contends that, like stalking, the offense of violating an order of protection is of a continuous nature, particularly where the alleged conduct occurred ov
2014 MT 52N Feb 25, 2014 Affirmed
Windsor v. Boushie
Majority by Laurie McKinnon · 5 to 0
ere, or (b) harassing, threatening, or intimidating the stalked person, in person or by mail, electronic communication, or any other action, device, or method. Section 45-5-220(1), MCA. There is no credible evidence that Boushie harassed, threatened, or intimidated Windsor. Moreover, the offense of stalking does not apply to a constitutionall
2014 MT 53N Feb 25, 2014 Affirmed
Windsor v. Boushie
Majority by Laurie McKinnon · 5 to 0
ere, or (b) harassing, threatening, or intimidating the stalked person, in person or by mail, electronic communication, or any other action, device, or method. Section 45-5-220(1), MCA. There is no credible evidence that Boushie harassed, threatened, or intimidated Windsor. Moreover, the offense of stalking does not apply to a constitutionall
2013 MT 147 Jun 4, 2013 Affirmed
Lear v. Jamrogowicz
Majority by Patricia Cotter · 5 to 0
idence that a person has violated this statute, the stalked person may obtain a restraining order under Title 40, chapter 15, MCA, against the alleged stalker. Section 45-5-220(4), MCA. ¶22 Section 40-15-101, MCA, makes clear that the purpose of Title 40, chapter 15, MCA, is “to promote the safety and protection of all victims of partner
2012 MT 64N Mar 13, 2012 Affirmed
Kendall v. Stambaugh
Majority by Mike McGrath · 5 to 0
ndalls’] property, as well as other verbal threats that would reasonably cause [the Kendalls] fear of harm,” justified an order of protection for stalking (§ 45-5-220, MCA). The District Court entered a permanent order of protection under § 40-15-204, MCA, to continue until June 18, 2012 at 1:30 p.m., “when there will be anoth
Official Annotations archive.org, 2023 edition
History:
En. Sec. 1, Ch. 292, L. 1993
Amd. Sec. 11, Ch. 350, L. 1995
Amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 344, L. 2003 (HB 54 - Newman, Brad (D) HD 38)
Amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 255, L. 2019 (SB 114 - Gross, Jen (D) SD 25)
Amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 444, L. 2023 (SB 321 - Boldman, Ellie (D) SD 45)